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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-2109 
___________ 
 
JASON L. BROWN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 
PENNSYLVANIA; LEGROME D. DAVIS, United States Judge; 
PETRESE B. TUCKER, United States Judge; 
NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, United States Judge 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-00747) 
District Judge:  Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 24, 2018 
Before:  KRAUSE, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 26, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Pro se appellant Jason Brown appeals from the judgment of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing his complaint pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  For the following reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
 In February 2018, Brown filed a complaint against the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and District Judges Legrome D. Davis, Petrese B. 
Tucker, and Nitza I. Quiñones-Alejandro.  The District Court dismissed his complaint 
without prejudice because Brown failed to provide any factual allegations to support his 
legal conclusions and permitted him to file an amended complaint.  Brown then filed an 
amended complaint, alleging that Defendants violated various civil and statutory rights 
and conspired against him by mishandling four of his previous district court cases.  The 
District Court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B), for being frivolous and baseless, and for failing to state a claim.  Brown 
appeals.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court’s sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) is plenary.  See 
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Where a complaint has not alleged 
sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face[,]” dismissal is 
appropriate.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  A complaint is considered frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.  
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See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 
1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1995).  A suit may be considered frivolous where defendants are 
clearly “immune from suit.”  Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. 
 The District Court properly dismissed all claims against the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity 
shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”  FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 
471, 475 (1994).  Because sovereign immunity has not been waived, the District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, as a judicial branch of the federal government, is 
entitled to sovereign immunity and is immune from suit.  See id. 
The District Court also properly dismissed all claims against District Judges 
Davis, Tucker, and Quiñones-Alejandro.  Brown’s claims against these defendants are 
barred by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity, as all of the allegations against them 
pertain only to actions taken in a judicial capacity, while they were presiding over 
Brown’s prior cases.  See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978); see also 
Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).1   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
                                              
1 Brown is correct that had the judges’ actions been taken in the complete absence of 
jurisdiction, they would not be entitled to judicial immunity.  See Gallas v. Supreme 
Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768–69 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 
12 (1991)).  However, to the extent that Brown alleged that District Judges Davis, 
Tucker, and Quiñones-Alejandro lacked jurisdiction because of errors in the appointment 
process, the District Court correctly determined that this allegation was frivolous. 
